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ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INTERPRETED THE
RELEASE TO INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES RELATED TO
THE COUNTERCLAIM. THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED FOR
APPEAL.

Golf Services and Tuhaye incorrectly assert that Richins Drilling failed to preserve
this issue. Richins Drilling argued at least three distinct times to the trial court that the
Release released atttorney's fees related to the counterclaim. In fact, Golf Services and
Tuhaye acknowledged such argument, and the objection and argument of Richins
Drilling was incorporated into two rulings by the trial court. It is difficult to imagine
what else Richins Drilling was required to do to preserve this issue for appellate review.
Richins Drilling first raised this issue after Golf Services and Tuhaye filed their
first attorney's fees affidavit. On July 15, 2005, counsel for Golf Service and Tuhaye
filed an affidavit in support of their request for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 598-601.)
Richins Drilling objected to the affidavit on the basis that the attorney's fees related to
the counterclaim were released pursuant to the Release and that the attorney's fees
affidavit did not allocate fees and costs between those claims that were successful and
those that were released. (R. 614-625.) Specifically, Richins Drilling argued:
In the case at hand, the Defendants clearly waived attorney fees in the
Release of All Counterclaims that they . . . could have claimed. . . . Just as
it can be argued that all fees, including fees associated with the prosecution
of the counterclaims, were necessary to the defense of the mechanics' lien
claim, as argued by Defendants in the Affidavit, it can also be argued that
all fees of Defendants up to the time of the Release, were necessary by the
Defendants to prosecute the Counterclaim. Yet, in the Release, the
Defendants clearly waived all fees associated with the prosecution of the
counterclaim. This was their agreement and obligation under the Release.

(R. 623.)

Next, on September 16, 2005, in their response to the objection filed by

Richins Drilling, Golf Services and Tuhaye acknowledged that "Plaintiff objected to the
claimed attorney fees and costs on three bases. First, Plaintiff asserted that the fees on
the counterclaim were 'waived' in the Release of all Counterclaims."

(R. 708.)

Additionally, it its reply memorandum in support of its Objection, Richins Drilling stated:
Defendants' Memorandum fails to take into consideration the effect of the
Release . . . Plaintiff is entitled to enforcement of the Release which it
paid valuable consideration for. In Defendants' Counterclaim, their first
cause of action was their claim for attorney fees based on Plaintiff's
breach of contract. . . . As stated by Defendants in their Memorandum,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendants, Richins Drilling paid $15,000.00
already in compromise of this provision and all other counterclaims.
Defendants are now trying to make Plaintiff pay again for the same thing.
(R. 721.) Next, in its ruling dated February 2, 2006, the trial court acknowledged that
"Richins Drilling objects to the initial and supplemental fees affidavit because GSG
released Richins from liability for attorney's fees relating to the counterclaim." (R. 732.)
(emphasis added).

The trial court found that "GSG released Richins Drilling from

liability for attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting the counterclaim." Id. In short, the
trial court recognized that Richins Drilling raised the issue of whether the Release
released Richins Drilling from liability for attorney's fees related to the counterclaim.
Following the trial court's ruling, Golf Services and Tuhaye filed an additional
affidavit. (R. 737-777.) Again, Richins Drilling objected and specifically renewed each
objection contained in the initial objection to the Golf Services' and Tuhaye's request for
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 785.) Finally, on May 1, 2006, the trial court issued its
Ruling Awarding Attorney's Fees to Defendants. (R. 794-804.) In this ruling, the trial
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court again acknowledged that "Richins Drilling objected to the affidavit because (1)
GSG had released Richins Drilling from liability for attorney's fees relating to the GSG's
counterclaim"

(R. 803.) (Emphasis added.)

The trial court, however, after two

objections filed by Richins Drilling arguing that the Release waived all attorney's fees
related to the counterclaim, nevertheless stated "The Court need not determine what the
parties intended by using the phase 'attorneys fees relating to the counterclaim.' Richins
Drilling has never contended that the release afforded it broader protection against
liability for attorney's fees than that permitted under Utah statutes and case law.
Therefore, any such argument is waived."1 (R. 803 n.l.) The trial court provided no
support for its conclusion that Richins Drilling waived this argument.
Under Utah law "[i]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 114, 48 P.3d
968. Utah courts have explained that there are three factors to determine whether a trial
court had such an opportunity: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the

1

This statement by the trial court is grounds alone for this Court to remand this case.
Richins Drilling has argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed
to determine the parties' intentions when they entered the Release. See Brief of
Appellant, at 20-21. In this case, there was no determination by the trial court of the
intent of the parties. Richins Drilling submitted argument that it was its contention that
all fees of Defendants up to the time of the Release were necessary to prosecute the
counterclaim and were therefore released when the Release was signed. (R. 623; 721;
785.) The trial court, however, made no finding and made no inquiry as the intention of
the parties when they signed the release. Having failed to do this, the trial court
committed reversible error. As a result, the proper remedy for this error is to remand the
case back to the trial court for a determination of the parties' intent when they entered
into the Release.
-3-

issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority." Id. (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847
(Utah 1998)). In this case Richins Drilling asks this Court to review whether the trial
court erred when it interpreted the Release in such a manner as to not release Golf
Services' or Tuhaye's claim for attorney's fees and costs related to the settled
counterclaim. This issue was preserved for appeal.
First, Richins Drilling timely raised the issue of whether the Release waived
attorney's fees and costs related to the counterclaim. After Golf Services and Tuhaye
filed their affidavit requesting attorney's fees, Richins Drilling objected on the basis that
the Release waived attorney's fees and costs related to the counterclaim. (R. 614-625.)
Richins Drilling renewed this objection after Golf Services and Tuhaye filed an amended
request for attorney's fees. (R. 785.) Second, Richins Drilling specifically raised the
issue of whether the Release waived all attorney's fees related to the counterclaim with
the trial court. As explained above, in each of its objections, Richins Drilling argued that
the trial court should deny Golf Services' and Tuhaye's request for fees related to the
counterclaim because those fees were waived. Lastly, in support of those arguments,
Richins Drilling submitted relevant evidence in support its position.

(R. 614-625.)

Richins Drilling, therefore, more than adequately preserved this issue for this Court to
review.2

At most, contrary to the arguments of Golf Services and Tuhaye, the only argument that
the trial court considered waived was whether the Release was broader that Utah law, not
whether the Release released attorney's fees related to the counterclaim.
-4-

II.

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDING OF AMBIGUITY OR
OTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE TO ADD TO THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT,
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR.

The Contract clearly states the compensation to be paid to Richins Drilling upon
termination. It says that upon termination, Golf Services must pay Richins Drilling the
amounts due under the Contract based on the time spent and the material purchased
(Contract f 16.3(c).) With respect to when the Contract is terminated, the Contract does
not make any reference to any other contractual duty, nor does it impose any further
duties on Richins Drilling. It does not reference whether Richins Drilling should comply
with industry standards or what should be the amount charged for the work performed. It
simply states, upon termination Golf Services should pay Richins Drilling the amount
due under the Contract. The trial court, however, did not apply this provision. Instead,
the trial court considered substantial intrinsic evidence.
In opposition to this argument, Golf Service and Tuhaye suggest that the trial court
did not err when it inserted duties into the Contract that were not part of the express terms
of the Contract. Nowhere in Golf Services' and Tuhaye's argument, however, do they
suggest that the terms of the Contract were ambiguous, nor did the trial court find that the
terms of the Contract were ambiguous. Therefore, the trial court's reliance on extrinsic
evidence, including the testimony of Randy Mayer, to insert contractual terms into the
Contract was erroneous. Under Utah law for extrinsic evidence to be considered, the
contract must be ambiguous. See Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, f
16, 52 P.3d 1179 (stating "a court will look to extrinsic evidence only when the contract
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language is ambiguous") In other words, it is a necessary prerequisite for the trial court
have found that the Contract was ambiguous before it considered extrinsic evidence to
vary or add to the express terms of the Contract. The Contract is not ambiguous and,
therefore, it was an error to use this extrinsic evidence to add terms to the Contract.
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the contract's four corners "to
determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling." Bakowski at f 16. Further, "if
the language of the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be
interpreted as a matter of law." Saleh v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2006 UT 20, \ 21,
133 P.3d 428 (refusing to consider extrinsic evidence, holding that doing so "would
require us to radically alter, and not for the better, our analytical approach to contract
interpretation by making even unambiguous contract terms vulnerable to modification by
extrinsic evidence"). Lastly, the reviewing court "will not make a better contract for the
parties than they have made for themselves. Nor will we avoid the contract's plain
language to achieve an 'equitable' result." Id. at f 19 (citations omitted). Here, by
reading a maximum price, a time for completion, and a method into the Contract, the trial
court incorrectly strove for an equitable result and gave Golf Services a better contract
than it made for itself. To do so is reversible error.
For example in Saleh, the defendant claimed that certain language in an insurance
policy allowed it to retain the value of depreciation. Id. at f 13. The plaintiff, however,
argued that those terms were ambiguous and proffered an alternative interpretation of the
policy. Id. In affirming the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "equitable
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doctrines are not . . . within the tool box of contract interpretation. In the context of
contract interpretation, therefore, it is irrelevant whether insurance companies . . .
regularly pay the depreciation value prior to completion . . . Farmers has bound itself
through textually unambiguous language, and it is not within this Court's purview to bind
it more." Id. at f 22. The Utah Supreme Court disregarded industry standards and
practices when the contract between the parties was unambiguous.
In this case, the trial court impermissibly bound Richins Drilling to contractual
provisions not found in the unambiguous contract. The Contract does not (1) provide any
completion date, (2) specify an amount for which the well must be completed, or (3)
require Richins Drilling to use the "Reverse-Rotary" method for drilling. The court,
however, treated these provisions as part of the Contract and excused performance by
Golf Services and Tuhaye because Richins Drilling apparently breached these added
terms. This was contrary to the plain terms of the Contract providing for the work to be
done on an "hourly, time and materials basis" and with payment at the applicable
daywork rate in the event of a termination.
Unlike the court's instruction in Bakowski and Saleh, the trial court here rewrote
the Contract and made a "better contract" for Golf Services than it made for itself. See
Bakowski, at f 19. The net effect was to fully undermine the Contract that Golf Services
signed, and relieve it from the deal it made.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURTS RELIANCE ON PAROL EVIDENCE
WITHOUT DETERMINING WHETHER THE CONTRACT WAS
OR WAS NOT INTEGRATED WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.

In their brief, Golf Services and Tuhaye admit that the trial court "heard parol
evidence at trial." See Brief of Appellee, at 19 n.2. As pointed out by Golf Services and
Tuhaye, the trial court recognized that it was admitting parol evidence and explicitly
indicated that it later intended to resolve the issue of whether the Contract was integrated.
Id.\ (R. 831 at 114:16-115:3). The trial court, however, never did resolve the issue of
whether the Contract was integrated.

The failure of the trial court to resolve this

fundamental issue before it considered and relied upon parol evidence to interpret the
terms of the Contract is reversible error.
Utah courts have made it clear that before a trial court applies the above-explained
parol evidence rule, the trial court "must determine as questions of fact: (1) whether the
agreement is integrated and, if so, (2) whether that integration is complete or partial. The
Catamar, LLC v. Champagne, 2006 UT App. 321, \ 11 (citing Eie v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981) ("'[T]he court must determine as a question of
fact whether the parties did in fact adopt a particular writing or writings as the final and
complete expression of their bargain."')). Failure by the court to make a determination as
a question of fact as to whether the contract was integrated is reversible error. See Union
Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665-66 (Utah 1985) (reversing and remanding to the trial
court to make "a specific determination as to whether the note was an integration"). Golf
Services and Tuhaye cite to no relevant case law, nor do they point to anything in the
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record, to contradict this conclusion—the trial court erred when it considered parol
evidence without determining whether the Contract was integrated. As a result, without
making such a finding, it was error for the trial court to consider parol evidence regarding
the parties' intentions, even if the evidence presented merely supplemented the terms of
the Contract.

This Court should, therefore, remand this case to the trial court to

determine whether the Contract was integrated and whether the admittance of parol
evidence interpreting the Contract was correct.
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CONCLUSION

The trial court incorrectly interpreted of two agreements between the parties.
First, the trial court incorrectly rewrote the Contract to deprive Richins Drilling of the
central contract terms to which Golf Services agreed.

Second, the Release entitled

Richins Drilling to be released, without limitation, from any further claims relating to the
counterclaim, including claims for attorney's fees and costs. The trial court incorrectly
interpreted that contract to leave Richins Drilling exposed for fees and costs that did in
fact relate to the counterclaim. As to both of these errors, Richins Drilling respectfully
submits that this court should reverse the trial court's order and remand this case so that
these contracts can both be enforced as they were written and agreed to by the contracting
parties.
DATED this

day of December, 2007.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

John R. Lund
P. Matthew Cox
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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